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Abstract  
A recent human-in-the-loop simulation in the 
Airspace Operations Laboratory (AOL) at 
NASA’s Ames Research Center investigated the 
robustness of Controller-Managed Spacing 
(CMS) operations. CMS refers to AOL-
developed controller tools and procedures for 
enabling arrivals to conduct efficient Optimized 
Profile Descents with sustained high 
throughput. The simulation provided a rich data 
set for examining how a traffic management 
supervisor and terminal-area controller 
participants used the CMS tools and 
coordinated to respond to off-nominal events. 
This paper proposes quantitative measures for 
characterizing the participants’ responses. Case 
studies of go-around events, replicated during 
the simulation, provide insights into the 
strategies employed and the role the CMS tools 
played in supporting them. 
1   Introduction  
An important research objective of the NASA 
Airspace Systems Program Super-Density 
Operations (SDO) research focus area is to 
safely sustain high runway throughput while 
minimizing environment impacts through fuel-
efficient operations. Scheduling arrivals to fly 
Optimized Profile Descents (OPDs) along Area 
Navigation (RNAV) routes in the terminal area 
is a central element of the SDO concept of 
operations [1]. Maintaining RNAV OPDs 
requires managing arrival flows using primarily 
speed control; tools to aid controllers in this task 
have been developed in the Airspace Operations 
Laboratory (AOL) at NASA Ames Research 
Center [2] as part of a research effort referred to 
as Controller-Managed Spacing (CMS). 
 CMS research first focused on controller 
decision-support tool (DST) development and 
assessment under nominal operations [3, 4]. An 
SDO-sponsored AOL simulation conducted in 
the spring of 2011, named CMS4, broadened the 
scope of the initial efforts by investigating the 
robustness of CMS operations to disturbances 
that may arise due to off-nominal events [5]. In 
addition, CMS4 afforded the opportunity to 
examine the potential role of a Traffic 
Management Supervisor responsible for 
coordinating with terminal-area controllers to 
adjust the arrival schedule to support recovery 
from significant disturbances [6]. 
 This paper examines case studies drawn 
from replications of scripted go-around events 
simulated in CMS4. During these events, the 
supervisor had to adjust arrival schedules to 
reinsert go-around aircraft into the arrival flows 
and controllers had to perform control actions to 
reestablish aircraft on schedule in order to 
restore nominal operations. In order to better 
characterize the effects of applying particular 
recovery strategies, and how well the CMS 
DSTs supported the efforts in a particular 
operational context, quantitative measures of the 
schedule adjustments, the resulting schedule, 
and the control actions required to achieve it are 
presented.  
First the paper presents some 
background on schedule-based OPD arrival 
operations and the CMS DSTs. Second, it 
introduces the CMS4 operational environment 
and uses one of the case studies to illustrate how 
the DSTs might be used to manage a go-around, 
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and discusses ways in which off-nominal events 
can impact the DSTs themselves. Third, go-
around case-studies are described in detail, 
together with their quantitative measures. And 
lastly, the findings and the value of such 
analyses for formulating effective DSTs and 
procedures for restoring nominal operations are 
discussed. 
2    Background  
When traffic demand is low, managing efficient 
descents is straightforward because controllers 
seldom need to intervene. However, maintaining 
OPDs during sustained periods of heavy 
demand becomes difficult since current-day 
control techniques, including altitude level-offs 
and heading vectors, disrupt OPDs. Speed 
control is also difficult to apply [7]. DSTs are 
needed to help controllers primarily use speed 
control to manage fuel-efficient OPDs for busy 
arrival flows [8]. 
DSTs for merging and spacing aircraft in 
the terminal area have included ‘ghosting’ 
displays and/or clearance advisories; Callantine 
[9], and Kupfer [3] review previous research in 
this area. The CMS DSTs differ in that they 
leverage RNAV OPDs for trajectory 
predictions, and in turn, the arrival schedule, to 
provide controllers with both temporal and 
spatial information to support the merging of 
OPD arrival flows while maintaining high 
throughput.  
2.1   Nominal CMS Operations and DSTs 
The schedule-based SDO arrival management 
concept underpinning CMS assumes all aircraft 
are Flight Management System- (FMS-) 
equipped so as to enable Vertical Navigation 
(VNAV) descents along published RNAV 
OPDs. En-route controllers are assumed to 
condition arrival flows so that aircraft enter 
terminal radar approach control (TRACON) 
airspace with schedule errors ranging from 60 s 
early to 30 s late approximately. These errors 
are small enough that they can be corrected with 
speed adjustments alone. TRACON Feeder 
controllers then use schedule information and 
other DSTs to issue speeds as required for 
adjusting aircraft toward their Scheduled Time-  
Figure 1.  CMS tools. 
of-Arrival (STA), while still keeping them on 
their assigned RNAV OPD. Final controllers 
issue speeds to remove any residual schedule 
errors. They also ensure that aircraft are safely 
merged, established on the final approach, and 
delivered to the tower such that proper spacing 
will be achieved at the runway threshold. 
 The CMS DSTs are designed to provide 
TRACON controllers with temporal as well as 
spatial awareness of each aircraft’s progress 
relative to its STA, and also suggest speeds that 
controllers can issue to correct schedule errors 
[3] (Figure 1). Schedule timelines show 
Estimated Times-of-Arrival (ETAs) on the left 
and STAs on the right for each aircraft that 
crosses a scheduling point, such as a runway or 
a merge point (Figure 1a). The scheduling 
algorithm computes an aircraft’s ETA using 
trajectory predictions based upon its current 
position and assigned RNAV OPD; it 
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determines the STAs by applying the required 
time-spacing between each aircraft in the arrival 
sequence, as determined by the ETAs. The 
scheduling algorithm locks the STAs in place 
when aircraft cross a specified ‘freeze horizon,’ 
in order to provide a stable control target. The 
CMS DSTs also include an early/late indication 
displayed in the third line of the data block to 
provide controllers with schedule-conformance 
information for a given aircraft without 
diverting their attention from it (Figure 1b). 
CMS slot markers convert temporal 
schedule information into a spatial target 
controllers can work toward; they display where 
a given aircraft would be if it were flying its 
assigned RNAV OPD speed/altitude profile 
through the forecast wind field and arrived on 
time at the scheduling point (Figure 1c). 
Dwelling on an aircraft’s data block brightens it 
and highlights its slot marker and timeline 
entries (Figure 1a/1d). The ground automation 
computes each aircraft’s slot marker to follow 
the RNAV OPD assigned to that aircraft in the 
ground system. 
The CMS DSTs also include speed 
advisories; those used in CMS4 were 
formulated as a speed that, if flown until 
decelerating to meet a published speed 
restriction at a downstream waypoint, then 
rejoining the nominal speed profile, results in a 
predicted on-time arrival for the aircraft. When 
available, the advised speed and fix name are 
presented in the third line of the data block, 
replacing the early/late indication (Figure 1d). 
Successful CMS evaluations [3, 4] 
paved the way for testing the robustness of the 
concept and DSTs during off-nominal events.  
3   CMS4 Simulation of Off-Nominal Events 
CMS4 is a real-time human-in-the-loop 
simulation of TRACON operations conducted in 
the AOL during spring 2011, described in detail 
in [5]. FMS-equipped, west-flow arrival traffic 
transited Southern California TRACON (SCT) 
airspace on RNAV OPDs to runways 24R and 
25L at Los Angeles International airport (LAX) 
(Figure 2).  Participants staffed three Feeder 
sectors (201, 204, and 205) and two Final 
sectors (202 and 203); in addition, one served as 
the traffic management supervisor, and a 
Figure 2.  Test sectors and RNAV OPDs to 
LAX runways 25L and 24R. 
confederate staffed the Tower position. Each 
simulation trial included two off-nominal 
events, one involving an aircraft assigned to 
runway 25L and one involving a 24R aircraft 
(see [5] for a complete description). The off-
nominal events were expected to disrupt the 
arrival flows enough to require schedule 
adjustments and, as a result, delays that would 
be too large for controllers to absorb with speed 
control alone. Path options in the form of named 
RNAV arrival routes were therefore defined in 
accordance with controller feedback to help 
them absorb larger delays (Figure 3). Among 
the path options were ‘long’ and ‘short’ go-
around routes designed to provide flexibility in 
reinserting go-arounds into the arrival flows 
(green routes that begin at the IGUPE and 
FUMBL waypoints in Figure 3). 
Figure 3.  RNAV path options and go-around 
routes. 
Two types of go-around events were 
scripted to occur in CMS4: pilot-initiated go-
arounds and tower-initiated go-arounds. Pilot-
Go-around 
routes 
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initiated go-arounds were triggered when the 
designated aircraft was below 4000 ft MSL 
approximately 15 nmi from the runway. The 
controlling pseudo-pilot would contact the final 
controller, declare a landing gear malfunction, 
and request a go-around to fix the issue. The 
final controller would cancel the approach 
clearance, and then issue an altitude to maintain 
(e.g., “USA395, roger, cancel approach 
clearance, climb and maintain 7000, remain 
inbound to runway 24R, expect further 
instructions shortly.”).  The final controller 
would then announce “Go-around!” to alert the 
supervisor that a go-around was in progress, and 
notify the tower confederate that the aircraft 
would be going around. Tower-initiated go-
arounds were triggered when the aircraft ahead 
of the designated aircraft landed and was ‘slow 
to clear the runway.’ The tower confederate 
would contact the final controller (who assumed 
the role of a departure controller in these 
situations) via ground-ground voice 
communication, identify the go-around, and 
receive instructions about which go-around 
procedure to assign the aircraft and which 
feeder controller the aircraft should contact. 
Similarly, the final controller would announce 
“Go-around!” to alert the supervisor and other 
controllers. For both types of go-arounds, the 
process of recovering from the off-nominal then 
began. 
The tower-initiated go-around event for 
runway 25L assumed the go-around aircraft 
would be worked primarily by the feeder 
controller at sector 205, before returning to 
sector 203 again, while the intended effect of 
the pilot-initiated go-around for runway 24R 
was to have the feeder controller at sector 201 
work the go-around aircraft before returning it 
to sector 202 again.  Depending on how the 
schedule was adjusted in response to the go-
around, other aircraft coming through the feeder 
sectors could be impacted as well.   
3.1   Supervisor Rescheduling Support 
The controllers and supervisor were expected to 
coordinate as necessary to resolve situations 
arising due to off-nominal events while 
attempting, to the extent possible, to continue 
OPD operations and sustain high throughput.  
Figure 4.  Supervisor timeline rescheduling 
buttons and bars indicating schedule gaps 
(green) and insufficient spacing (red). 
Controllers were asked to manipulate the traffic 
using only speed clearances and the pre-defined 
path options if possible, although vectoring was 
still a valid option.  The supervisor was asked to 
manage the schedule and attempt to maintain 
high runway utilization, working the schedule 
only as far out as the first aircraft that was 
outside the schedule freeze-horizon 
(approximate 80 nmi from the runways). The 
controllers and the supervisor were free to 
coordinate to formulate off-nominal recovery 
plans and use the tools to achieve them as they 
saw fit.  
The supervisor staffed a MACS 
workstation [2] with a traffic display and CMS 
runway-schedule timelines. The supervisor 
could adjust the viewable range of the traffic 
display to visualize aircraft relevant to 
rescheduling problems, and manipulate the 
schedule timelines in several ways: 
 Re-assign an aircraft’s STA. 
 Swap STAs for two aircraft. 
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 Move a specified ‘block’ of STAs by a 
specified time. 
 Reschedule (‘reset’) a specified block of 
aircraft. 
 Assign an aircraft to a different runway 
schedule. 
The supervisor performed all of these operations 
by entering commands in the shortcut window 
on his workstation. Commands could be 
composed using a combination of text entries 
and mouse-selections on the timelines. To aid 
the supervisor in performing schedule 
assessments, the timelines were also modified 
with green and red bars that indicated gaps (or 
‘slack’) or insufficient spacing in a schedule, 
respectively (Figure 4). 
3.2   CMS DSTs under Off-Nominal 
Conditions 
The process of re-inserting the go-around 
aircraft in the arrival flow required a 
coordinated set of actions from the controllers 
and the supervisor.  An example of how the 
controller DSTs could impact the supervisor’s 
DSTs, and vice versa is presented in the 
following case study T4, a tower-initiated go-
around (Figure 5). Tower-initiated go-arounds 
occurred when the aircraft was close to runway, 
with the aircraft’s ETA and STA near the 
bottom of the timeline (not shown). After the 
aircraft passed the runway, its original runway 
STA would drop off the timeline; without a 
valid STA, the ground automation is unable to 
compute speed advisories or a slot marker for 
the aircraft (Figure 5a). Once the controller 
assigns a go-around procedure to the aircraft, 
the scheduling algorithm is able generate a new 
ETA for the aircraft and display it on the 
runway timeline; Figure 5b shows the new ETA 
reflecting the assigned procedure for SWA5488 
(go-around) appearing between FFT1134 and 
AAL5321, with a new STA yet to be assigned. 
The supervisor could then adjust the timeline to 
make room for the go-around aircraft. Here the 
supervisor identifies two areas of nearby slack 
in the schedule and, using his scheduling tools, 
creates a new slot for the go-around aircraft. In 
this case, the supervisor first advanced 
FFT1134’s STA, taking advantage of the slack 
in front of it (Figure 5c). This effectively 
combined the slack that was in front of 
FFT1134 with the additional slack that was 
behind it, creating an obvious gap in the 
schedule in which to assign the new STA for 
SWA5488 (Figure 5d). This produced the final 
plan (Figure 5e). With a valid STA for the 
 
Figure 5.  Sequence of events from case study T4 involved with reinserting a go-around aircraft 
into the arrival schedule for runway 25L (clockwise from bottom left).
Mercer, Callantine, and Martin 
6 
aircraft, the automation again computes speed 
advisories and a slot marker for the go-around 
aircraft, which the controller can then use to 
reinsert the aircraft into the arrival flow (Figure 
5f). 
This example highlights how off-
nominal events, and the manner in which they 
are addressed, impact the DSTs. First, unless an 
aircraft has a route assigned, and is not vectored 
too far off it, the ground automation cannot 
perform the trajectory predictions required to 
produce a reasonable ETA for the aircraft. 
Without an ETA, the scheduling algorithm 
cannot generate an STA for the aircraft, and it 
becomes difficult to gauge where an STA for 
the aircraft could be inserted into the schedule. 
Second, because the trajectory predictions that 
underlie the CMS slot markers and speed 
advisories use STAs as a reference, these DSTs 
require STAs for their associated aircraft, and 
are most useful for control when the STA is one 
the aircraft can reasonably achieve along its 
assigned RNAV route. Additionally, STA 
changes that occur when the schedule is 
adjusted cause immediate changes to the slot-
marker positions of the affected aircraft on the 
controller displays. Thus, timely route 
assignments and judicious scheduling actions 
bolster the usability and usefulness of the DSTs 
for restoring nominal operations. The following 
analyses support these effects. 
4   Results 
The CMS4 simulation provided a rich set of 
data on the robustness of the CMS concept and 
DSTs. This paper extends analyses presented in 
[5] and [6] by quantifying scheduling and 
control actions for a particular simulation trial 
that was replicated four times (with randomized 
aircraft call signs) during CMS4. The trial 
included a tower-initiated go-around (denoted 
‘T’) for runway 25L and a pilot-initiated go-
around (denoted ‘P’) for runway 24R. Case 
studies T1 and P1 are drawn from the first 
replication, T2 and P2 from the second, etc. 
Contextual elements behind quantitative 
measures of the rescheduling and control 
actions are presented for each. 
4.1   Off-Nominal Recovery Metrics 
Table 1 presents measures related to recovering 
from the tower-initiated go-around (‘T’) events 
and the pilot-initiated go-around (‘P’) events. 
The first three rows of Table 1 provide 
measures of how the supervisor adjusted the 
schedules to accommodate the affected aircraft. 
‘Schedule adjustment time’ refers to the 
difference in time between the supervisor’s first 
and last schedule manipulation when responding 
to a given off-nominal event. The number of 
individual schedule-adjustment actions and the 
number of aircraft STAs affected by the 
adjustments are shown in rows two and three, 
followed by the cumulative amount of delay that 
was added to the schedule. Negative values in 
this row indicate that, overall, resulting STAs 
were earlier than STAs before the adjustments; 
thus, the schedule was advanced.  
The next six rows of metrics in Table 1 
pertain to control actions taken by controllers to 
bring aircraft into conformance with the 
adjusted schedule, starting with the number of 
unique aircraft that received clearances during 
the off-nominal recovery period. Subsequent 
rows tally the types of clearances issued.  The 
numbers of direct-to clearances, (heading) 
vectors, and ‘open’ speeds reflect the extent to 
which controllers used current-day control 
techniques. Speed advisories and pre-defined 
paths reflect the degree to which controllers 
used the CMS speed advisories and assigned 
aircraft to RNAV routes they could specify to 
the ground automation. The last row gives the 
amount of time that elapsed during the recovery 
process, from the time of the first action related 
to the off-nominal event to the last. These 
metrics are used to describe similarities and 
differences between different replications of the 
same off-nominal events as they played out 
during CMS4, in terms of strategies the 
supervisor applied, salient contextual factors, 
and the role of the CMS DSTs. 
4.2   Off-Nominal Recovery Strategies, 
Contextual Factors, and DST Implications 
During the recovery, the supervisor often used 
the updated ETA for an aircraft that the ground 
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Table 1.  Quantitative metrics for the tower-initiated go-arounds to runway 25L (T1 – T4) and 
the pilot-initiated go-arounds to runway 24R (P1 – P4).
automation computed when the aircraft was 
assigned a particular go-around procedure to 
identify which areas of slack, if any, could be 
rearranged into a new slot (or partial slot) close 
to the updated ETA. This strategy was shown to 
be successful in several case studies; T1, T4, P1, 
and P2 all had relatively few schedule 
adjustments, necessitating clearances for small 
numbers of aircraft during the recovery period.  
In T1 and T4, the supervisor leveraged slack in 
the schedule to create a new slot by advancing 
one aircraft’s STA; in P1 and P2, the same 
adjustment yielded only a partial slot, so the 
supervisor additionally reset the STAs of the 
next few aircraft, delaying them as necessary to 
make room for the go-around aircraft. The 
effectiveness of this approach in these four 
cases is reflected in the small absolute values of 
overall delay added to the schedule shown in 
Table 1. The supervisor’s simple description of 
his strategy after completing P2 suggests he 
recognized this: “I assigned a slot, rippled the 
list, and that was that. I would not have done 
anything differently.”   
The supervisor attempted to apply a 
similar strategy in case studies P3 and P4, which 
had comparable numbers of schedule 
adjustments and affected STAs, but it was not as 
effective in these cases because it added more 
overall delay to the schedule. The schedule in 
P3 initially had the least amount of slack, thus 
adding more delay was unavoidable, while in 
P4, the supervisor chose to uniformly shift the 
STAs behind the go-around aircraft’s slot back 
by 15 seconds, impacting the affected STAs 
more.  Table 1 illustrates how the larger impact 
to the schedules in P3 and P4 required the 
controllers to issue more clearances (including 
pre-defined path clearances) to bring aircraft 
into conformance with the new schedules, 
which in turn lengthened the required recovery 
time. 
The relationship between schedule 
impact and recovery time can be characterized 
by additional explanations, however, as 
illustrated by the quantitative data in Table 1 for 
case studies T1, T2, and P1—emphasizing the 
importance of context in interpreting 
quantitative metrics. The recovery time in T1 is 
slightly longer than for T2, but is not due to 
large schedule impact; rather, it stemmed from a 
lack of DST support for the sector 205 
controller. During T1, the tower confederate 
was unable to amend the go-around aircraft’s 
route in the ground automation, so the timeline 
display on sector 205’s scope did not have an 
ETA or STA for the go-around aircraft, and 
there was no slot marker available to aid the 
controller. This lack of information about where 
the go-around aircraft would merge back into 
the flow of traffic, combined with the geometry 
and distance between the two merging aircraft, 
Mercer, Callantine, and Martin 
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made the controller’s task very difficult. Only as 
the go-around aircraft neared the location at 
which the go-around procedure rejoined the 
nominal RNAV OPD did the controller realize 
that the go-around aircraft was actually behind 
where it needed to be, and the spacing to the 
trailing aircraft was not sufficient to allow the 
merge. The controller quickly issued a heading 
vector to ensure separation, followed by a 
direct-to clearance to shorten the go-around 
aircraft’s route. The controller then had to issue 
multiple speeds to maintain the required 
separation.   
The recovery strategy applied in case 
study T2 impacted the schedule similarly to P1, 
but the recovery time was much longer in T2. 
The larger numbers of schedule adjustments and 
affected STAs in T2 is not enough to explain the 
longer recovery time, which was actually traced 
to the particular strategy the supervisor 
attempted to apply.  In P1, the go-around 
aircraft was assigned the ‘long’ procedure, and 
the supervisor leveraged the existing slack in the 
schedule to make that work in a straightforward 
way, as evidenced by the clearance data for P1 
in Table 1.  However, in T2 the supervisor 
followed a more complicated strategy. The 
supervisor first identified a potential gap in the 
schedule that was three minutes ahead of the 
updated ETA that ground automation computed 
upon assignment of the go-around procedure. 
Next, the supervisor asked the final controller to 
maintain control of the go-around aircraft and 
vector it into the gap he was orchestrating. The 
supervisor then used existing slack in the 
schedule to create the earlier slot for the go-
around aircraft.  Consequently, the sector 203 
controller had to issue multiple instructions to 
the go-around aircraft over the course of several 
minutes to implement the supervisor’s plan. 
Thus, in T2, the supervisor’s apparent desire to 
resolve the off-nominal quickly added 
instability to the situation; the resulting plan 
required more clearances and was ultimately 
more difficult for the controllers to execute. 
Upon reflection, the value of those three 
minutes seemed marginal to the supervisor, who 
commented, “Thinking back on it, I should have 
agreed with the [long] procedure instead of 
experimenting with the radar vectors.” 
The data in Table 1 also support the 
value of a simple recovery plan, in case study 
T3. Whereas the supervisor’s decision to try a 
different recovery strategy led to the 
complications in T2, complications in T3 arose 
due to a pseudo-pilot error. T3 was difficult 
from the outset, because the schedule appeared 
to have less slack, and the supervisor spent more 
than eight minutes working with the schedule, 
trying to best adjust STAs so that he could take 
advantage of what little slack was available.  He 
accomplished this by first advancing the STAs 
of three aircraft, then assigning a new STA to 
the go-around aircraft in the resulting gap. This 
seemed to work well, but due to a pseudo-pilot 
error a few minutes later, the go-around aircraft 
failed to execute a turn and quickly became 
unable to meet the new time the supervisor had 
created; the supervisor consequently had to 
formulate a new plan and re-adjust the schedule. 
With the go-around aircraft completely off its 
route, the ground automation was computing 
unusable ETAs for it, which made it difficult to 
identify an appropriate time for its new STA. 
After discussing the issue with the sector 205 
controller, the supervisor tried swapping the 
STAs of the go-around aircraft and the aircraft 
following it, which did not resolve the issue.  
The supervisor next identified some slack later 
in the schedule, and using it as a partial slot, 
assigned a new STA to the go-around aircraft 
and reset all the subsequent STAs, again 
delaying them as necessary to make room for 
the go-around aircraft. Thus, in case T3, the 
context of the unexpected pseudo-pilot error 
brought about the longest observed schedule-
adjustment time and the large number of STAs 
that were adjusted, which in turn directly 
contributed to the large number of clearances 
controllers issued.   
Contextual factors surrounding the 
particular off-nominal event being addressed 
also affect the quantitative metrics and their 
interpretation. Case study P4 provides an 
example in which a short schedule-adjustment 
time suggests a relatively simple, and therefore 
effective, recovery plan, but this view is 
contradicted by the number of STAs affected 
and the amount of delay added to the schedule. 
The schedule-adjustment time in P4 is much 
9  
RESOLVING OFF-NOMINAL SITUATIONS IN SCHEDULE-BASED TERMINAL
AREA OPERATIONS: RESULTS FROM A HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP SIMULATION
shorter than that measured for P1, but because 
more delay was added to the schedule in P4, the 
STAs of more aircraft were affected and the 
recovery process required controllers to issue 
more clearances. However, comparing T2 with 
P1 requires a different interpretation. The 
amount of delay added to the schedule is similar 
for both, and P1 has the longer schedule 
adjustment period, but given the number of 
aircraft affected and the number of clearances 
issued, P1 appears to have been minimally 
disrupted. While the complicated strategy 
employed by the supervisor indeed affected the 
control actions in T2, another possible 
explanation for this difference is that the pilot-
initiated go-arounds were declared earlier than 
the tower-initiated go-arounds (farther away 
from the runway), allowing the supervisor more 
time to formulate a recovery plan. After a 
tower-initiated go-around was declared, the 
aircraft was nearing the end of its assigned route 
(the runway threshold), so there was a certain 
amount of pressure associated with quickly 
climbing the aircraft and assigning the desired 
go-around procedure. Whereas in a pilot-
initiated go-around event the aircraft was still 
several miles away from the runway, allowing 
the supervisor a few minutes to put a plan in 
place. Thus, in comparing P1 and T2, the 
number of affected STAs appears to be a 
stronger indicator of recovery-strategy 
effectiveness than schedule-adjustment time; in 
comparing P1 and P4, the absolute value of the 
amount of delay added to the schedule appears 
to be the strongest indicator. However, T1, T2, 
and P1 all demonstrate how contextual factors 
can influence the amount of delay added to the 
schedule. 
5    Discussion 
The case study analyses illustrate the value of 
the schedule-adjustment and control metrics in 
Table 1 for characterizing the effects and 
effectiveness of particular off-nominal recovery 
strategies for the schedule-based arrival 
operations in CMS4, together with the 
importance of also considering underlying 
contextual factors. Under different 
circumstances, different metrics reflect salient 
aspects of the recovery process. In general, the 
strategies that the supervisor applied were 
reasonably consistent, seeking to minimize the 
overall disturbance to the arrival flow.  
The case study analyses highlighted key 
interactions between the scheduling and control 
functions central to the CMS concept that could, 
at times, limit the usefulness of the CMS DSTs 
and the extensions provided in CMS4. 
Interdependencies of the DSTs were apparent in 
T1, when the failure to assign the aircraft’s 
RNAV go-around route in the ground 
automation left the sector 205 controller without 
DSTs. Without knowledge of the RNAV route, 
the automation could not compute a slot marker 
for the controller to use as a spatial target for 
reinserting the aircraft into the arrival stream. 
The problems experienced by the controller in 
T1 (together with other observations reported in 
[5]) highlight the utility of slot markers for 
managing off-nominal recovery, and emphasize 
the importance of considering such interactions 
when using the DSTs in off-nominal situations. 
T1 also provided an example of how the 
lack of an updated ETA for the go-around 
aircraft complicated the supervisor’s task. The 
supervisor could not readily determine where 
the go-around aircraft could be inserted, which 
made rescheduling it more difficult and likely 
increased the schedule-adjustment time. As 
observed in T3, clear coordination between the 
supervisor and controllers is also necessary 
when vectoring aircraft, as vectoring also 
reduces the accuracy and usability of ETAs the 
ground automation is able to generate, again 
complicating the supervisor’s efforts to 
formulate a new schedule. 
The case studies also suggest that 
improvements to the rescheduling functions 
available to supervisor are warranted. For 
instance, the supervisor inadvertently reset the 
schedule during T2, undoing a new sequence 
that had been determined and causing 
confusion. This episode made the supervisor 
hesitant to use the reset command, and he 
instead used the swap command to re-establish 
the desired sequence one swap at a time.  
During P4, the supervisor again had reservations 
about using the schedule reset function, and 
instead used the move function, which added 
unnecessary delay to the resulting schedule.  An 
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‘undo’ function could give the supervisor 
another method for correcting any undesired or 
mistaken schedule changes.  In addition, as 
highlighted in T2, establishing a plan and 
associated schedule quickly brings stability to 
the situation; however, due to the control 
actions that may be required, it may not be the 
fastest method for resolving an off-nominal 
event. Decisions regarding such trade-offs could 
be supported by scheduling DSTs that enable 
provisional, ‘what-if’ schedule planning, 
allowing the supervisor to coordinate with 
controllers about the implementation details of a 
proposed solution before putting the plan in 
place.  A related aspect of the current 
scheduling functions is that any rescheduling 
actions immediately propagate throughout the 
ground system; when a new STA is established, 
the automation re-computes the location of the 
slot marker associated with that aircraft on the 
controllers’ displays. Linking the provisional 
scheduling DSTs to provisional controller DSTs 
would further support coordination. 
6    Conclusion 
The CMS4 simulation exposed the air traffic 
control team to off-nominal events that caused 
large disturbances to the arrival flow of traffic.  
Their responses to the off-nominal events were 
analyzed as case studies in order to evaluate the 
overall effectiveness of different recovery 
strategies. 
This paper presents metrics for 
characterizing off-nominal recovery strategies in 
the CMS operational environment. Together 
with contextual information, the metrics provide 
insights for understanding how the CMS tools 
and related procedures support off-nominal 
recovery, and are useful for understanding the 
conditions under which particular off-nominal 
recovery strategies are most effective.  Future 
research should identify additional metrics for 
improving the characterization of operator 
strategies in the air traffic control environment.   
References 
[1] Isaacson, D., Robinson III, J., Swenson, H., and 
Denery, D. (2010). A Concept for Robust, High 
Density Terminal Air Traffic Operations. 
Proceedings of the AIAA Aviation Technology, 
Integration, and Operations Conference, Fort Worth, 
TX., USA. 
[2] Prevot, T., Lee, P., Callantine, T., Mercer, J., 
Homola, J., Smith, N., and Palmer, E. (2010). 
Human-in-the-Loop Simulation of NextGen 
Concepts in the Airspace Operations Laboratory. 
Proceedings of the AIAA Modeling and Simulation 
Technologies Conference, Toronto, Canada. 
[3] Kupfer, M., Callantine, T., Martin, L., Mercer, J., and 
Palmer, E. (2011). Controller Support Tools for 
Schedule-Based Terminal-Area Operations. 
Proceedings of the Ninth USA/Europe Air Traffic 
Management Research and Development Seminar, 
Berlin, Germany. 
[4] Callantine, T., Palmer, E., and Kupfer, M. (2010). 
Human-in-the-Loop Simulation of Trajectory-Based 
Terminal-Area Operations. Paper presented at the 
27th International Congress of the Aeronautical 
Sciences, Nice, France. 
[5] Callantine, T., Cabrall, C., Kupfer, M., Martin, L., 
and Mercer, J. (2011). Investigating the Impact of 
Off-Nominal Events on High-Density ‘Green’ 
Arrivals. Proceedings from the 23rd Digital Avionics 
System Conference, Seattle, WA., USA. 
[6] Martin, L., Mercer, J., Callantine, T., Kupfer, M., and 
Cabrall C. (2012).  Air Traffic Controllers’ Control 
Strategies in the Terminal Area under Off-Nominal 
Conditions. Proceedings of the 4th International 
Conference on Applied Human Factors and 
Ergonomics, San Francisco, CA., USA. 
[7] Davison-Reynolds, H., Reynolds T., and Hansman, 
R. J. (2005). Human Factors Implications of 
Continuous Descent Approach Procedures for Noise 
Abatement in Air Traffic Control. Proceedings of the 
Sixth USA/Europe Air Traffic Management Research 
and Development Seminar, Baltimore, MD., USA. 
[8] Becher, T., Barker, D., and Smith, A. (2004). 
Methods for Maintaining Benefits for Merging 
Aircraft on Terminal RNAV Routes. Proceedings 
from the 23rd Digital Avionics System Conference, 
Washington, D.C., USA. 
[9] Callantine, T., and Palmer, E. (2009). Controller 
Advisory Tools for Efficient Arrivals in Dense 
Traffic Environments.  Proceedings of the AIAA 
Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations 
Conference, Hilton Head, SC., USA. 
